

# Thwarting Control-Channel Jamming Attacks from Inside Jammers

Sisi Liu, *Student Member, IEEE*, Loukas Lazos, *Member, IEEE*, and Marwan Krunz, *Fellow, IEEE*  
 Department of Electrical and Computer Engineering  
 University of Arizona, Tucson, AZ 85721  
 E-mail: {sisimm, llazos, krunz}@ece.arizona.edu

## APPENDIX 1

**Proposition 1:** For two random and independently generated sequences  $m_j$  and  $m_\ell$ , defined over an alphabet  $\mathcal{A} = \{1, \dots, K\}$ , the expected Hamming distance  $E[d(m_j, m_\ell)]$  as a function of the sequence length  $X$  is given by

$$E[d(s_j, s_\ell)] = \frac{K-1}{K}X. \quad (1)$$

*Proof:* The proof is a direct consequence of the randomness and independence assumptions. Based on the sequence generation process outlined in Section 4.1,  $\Pr[m_j(i) = k] = \frac{1}{K}$ ,  $\forall i$ . Since the two sequences  $m_j$  and  $m_\ell$  are assumed to be independent and random, they differ at slot  $i$  with probability

$$\Pr[m_j(i) \neq m_\ell(i)] = \frac{K-1}{K}. \quad (2)$$

The expected Hamming distance between two sequences of length  $X$  is equal to the expected number of successes in  $X$  such Bernoulli trials, i.e.,  $E[d(m_j, m_\ell)] = \frac{K-1}{K}X$ .  $\square$

## APPENDIX 2

**Proposition 2:** Consider two random and independently generated sequences  $m_j$  and  $m_\ell$  that are defined over an alphabet  $\mathcal{A} = \{1, \dots, K\}$ . Suppose that the sequences are adjusted to  $m'_j$  and  $m'_\ell$ , respectively, according to the process outlined in Section 4.2. The expected Hamming distance  $E[d(m'_j, m'_\ell)]$  as a function of the length  $X$  of the sequences is

$$E[d(m'_j, m'_\ell)] = \left( 1 - (K(i) - y_K) \cdot \left(\frac{x_K}{K}\right)^2 - y_K \cdot \left(\frac{x_K + 1}{K}\right)^2 \right) \cdot X \quad (3)$$

where  $x_K \triangleq \lfloor \frac{K}{K(i)} \rfloor$  and  $y_K \triangleq [K \pmod{K(i)}]$ .

*Proof:* According to Step 2 in Section 4.2, the hopping sequences are modified by a modulo  $K(i)$  operation. The number of indexes of the original sequence that map to the same index in the modified sequence depends on the quotient of the division of  $K$  by  $K(i)$ , given by  $x_K = \lfloor \frac{K}{K(i)} \rfloor$ , and the remainder, given by  $y_K = [K \pmod{K(i)}]$ . In

particular, for a modified sequence  $m'_j$ , it follows from elementary modulo arithmetic that

$$\Pr[m'_j(i) = w] = \begin{cases} \frac{x_K + 1}{K}, & \text{if } 1 \leq w \leq y_K, y_K > 0. \\ \frac{x_K}{K}, & \text{if } y_K + 1 \leq w \leq K(i). \end{cases} \quad (4)$$

Let  $\mathcal{M}$  be the event that two modified sequences  $m'_j$  and  $m'_\ell$  match at slot  $i$ . Based on (4), we have

$$\Pr[\mathcal{M}] = \sum_{w=1}^{K(i)} \Pr[m'_j(i) = w, m'_\ell(i) = w] \quad (5a)$$

$$= \sum_{w=1}^{K(i)} \Pr[m'_j(i) = w] \Pr[m'_\ell(i) = w] \quad (5b)$$

$$= \sum_{w=1}^{y_K} \left(\frac{x_K + 1}{K}\right)^2 + \sum_{y_K+1}^{K(i)} \left(\frac{x_K}{K}\right)^2 \quad (5c)$$

$$= y_K \cdot \left(\frac{x_K + 1}{K}\right)^2 + (K(i) - y_K) \cdot \left(\frac{x_K}{K}\right)^2. \quad (5d)$$

Equation (5b) is due to the independence in the generation of the original sequences  $m_j$  and  $m_\ell$ . Equation (5c) is due to the probability distribution in (4) and Equation (5d) follows from the simplification of the sum. Given  $\Pr[\mathcal{M}]$ , it is easy to see that the expected Hamming distance for two sequences of length  $X$  is given by (3).  $\square$

## APPENDIX 3

**Proposition 5:** The optimal strategy of an external jammer is to continuously jam the channel that is most frequently visited by cluster nodes.

*Proof:* Let  $c_{jam}$  denote the subsequence of  $m_{jam}$  corresponding to the locations of control channel slots; i.e.,  $c_{jam} = \{m_{jam}(i) : i \in v\}$  ( $v$  denotes the random slot position vector). Let also  $\mathcal{P} = \{p_1, p_2, \dots, p_K\}$  and  $\mathcal{Q} = \{q_1, q_2, \dots, q_K\}$  denote the probability distribution functions from which values  $c(i)$  and  $c_{jam}(i)$  are drawn, respectively.  $\mathcal{Q}$  is optimal when the expected Hamming distance  $E[d(c, c_{jam})]$  is minimized, i.e., the jammer is able to overlap with  $c$  in the maximum number of slots. Suppose that  $\pi = \{\pi(1), \dots, \pi(k)\}$  is a permutation of the set of

channels  $\{1, \dots, K\}$  such that  $p_{\pi(1)} \geq \dots \geq p_{\pi(K)}$ . That is, the discrete probabilities of  $\Pr[c(i) = k]$  are arranged in descending order. The probability that  $c$  and  $c_{jam}$  overlap at index  $i$  (which corresponds to slot  $v(i)$ ) is

$$\begin{aligned} \Pr[c(i) = c_{jam}(i)] &= \sum_{j=1}^K \Pr[c(i) = \pi(j), c_{jam}(i) = \pi(j)] \\ &= \sum_{j=1}^K p_{\pi(j)} q_{\pi(j)} \end{aligned} \quad (6)$$

For a sequence of length  $X$ , the expected Hamming distance between  $c$  and  $c_{jam}$  is  $E[d(c, c_{jam})] = (1 - \Pr[c(i) = c_{jam}(i)])X$  (overlapping in two different slots are independent events). Hence, the expected Hamming distance is minimized when (6) is maximized.

Maximization of (6) can be shown as follows. Consider two distributions  $\mathcal{P} = \{p_1, p_2, \dots, p_K\}$  and  $\mathcal{Q} = \{q_1, q_2, \dots, q_K\}$ , and also consider two cases for the distribution  $\mathcal{Q}$ :  $\{q_{\pi(1)}, q_{\pi(2)}, \dots, q_{\pi(K)}\} = \{1, 0, \dots, 0\}$  and  $\{q'_{\pi(1)}, q'_{\pi(2)}, \dots, q'_{\pi(K)}\}$  with  $q'_{\pi(1)} < 1$ . Let  $S = \sum_{j=1}^K p_{\pi(j)} q_{\pi(j)}$  and  $S' = \sum_{j=1}^K p_{\pi(j)} q'_{\pi(j)}$ . Then,

$$\begin{aligned} S' - S &= \sum_{j=1}^K p_{\pi(j)} q'_{\pi(j)} - \sum_{j=1}^K p_{\pi(j)} q_{\pi(j)} \\ &= \sum_{j=1}^K p_{\pi(j)} q'_{\pi(j)} - p_{\pi(1)} \cdot q_{\pi(1)} \\ &\leq \sum_{j=1}^K p_{\pi(1)} q'_{\pi(j)} - p_{\pi(1)} \\ &= p_{\pi(1)} \sum_{j=1}^K q'_j - p_{\pi(1)} \\ &= 0. \end{aligned}$$

Hence,  $\sum_{j=1}^K p_{\pi(j)} q_{\pi(j)}$  is maximized when the distribution  $\{q_{\pi(1)}, q_{\pi(2)}, \dots, q_{\pi(K)}\} = \{1, 0, \dots, 0\}$ .  $\square$

## APPENDIX 4

Proposition 6: In static spectrum networks, the expected evasion delay  $E[D]$  for re-establishing the control channel when no node has been compromised is

$$E[D] = \frac{K}{K-1} \cdot \frac{L+M}{M}. \quad (7)$$

*Proof:*  $E[D]$  is equal to the expected number of required slots  $\mathcal{N}$  before the control-channel slot occurs for the first time, times the number of tries  $\mathcal{R}$  needed to evade jamming. Thus,

$$E[D] = E[\mathcal{R}\mathcal{N}] = E[\mathcal{R}]E[\mathcal{N}]. \quad (8)$$

Note that  $\mathcal{R}$  and  $\mathcal{N}$  are independent random variables. The probability of evading jamming for random hopping sequences, assuming an optimal jamming strategy, is equal to  $\frac{K-1}{K}$ . Thus,  $E[\mathcal{R}] = \frac{K}{K-1}$ . By construction, slot  $i$  is a

control-channel slot with probability  $\frac{M}{L+M}$ . Therefore, the first re-occurrence of the control channel follows a geometric distribution with parameter  $\frac{M}{L+M}$ , and  $E[\mathcal{N}] = \frac{L+M}{M}$ . Substituting  $E[\mathcal{R}]$  and  $E[\mathcal{N}]$  into (8) completes the proof.  $\square$

## APPENDIX 5

Proposition 7: The expected delay until the new CH assigns new hopping sequences to  $n-1$  cluster nodes (excluding the compromised CH) is

$$E[D_2] = \frac{K^2}{K-1} (n-1) X_c. \quad (9)$$

*Proof:* Once the CH is considered compromised, all cluster nodes hop according to self-generated random sequences. Let  $m_{CH}$  denote the hopping sequence of the new CH. The CH succeeds in communicating with node  $n_j$  at slot  $i$  if  $m_{CH}(i) = m_j(i)$  and  $m_{CH}(i) \neq m_{jam}(i)$ . Given that the sequences  $m_j$  and  $m_{CH}$  are random,

$$\Pr[m_j = m_{CH}, m_j \neq m_{jam}] = \frac{1}{K} \frac{K-1}{K} = \frac{K-1}{K^2}. \quad (10)$$

The number of slots until the first success is geometrically distributed with mean of  $\frac{K^2}{K-1}$ . The CH has to repeat the same process for all  $n-1$  cluster nodes (the compromised CH is excluded from the hopping sequence update process). Assuming that  $X_c$  time slots are needed for the assignment of the new sequence, the expected delay  $E[D_2]$  until all cluster nodes have received a new hopping sequence is equal to  $\frac{K^2}{K-1} (n-1) X_c$ .  $\square$